Book Reviews

Easter 1916 – The Irish Rebellion

Penguin, 2006 by Charles Townshend

The Easter Rising as an event is one of the most dramatic witnessed in Ireland in the past century. It captured the imagination of the world and to this day it is still celebrated in the minds, literature and life of each new generation. From the “apparent naivety” (Mary McAleese, 27th Jan, 2006) of the Proclamation to the diversity of the characters involved in the build up, planning and execution of the revolution there is much to talk about. The intricate web that the Irish Republican Brotherhood weaved around the Irish Volunteers, the Irish Citizen Army, Cumann na mBan and of course Na Fianna is perhaps one of the more fascinating elements of the Rising. There are also love stories, hilarious anecdotes, bizarre occurrences, ships smuggling arms, political intrigues and terrible tragedies. In fact if the Easter Rising had not happened someone in Hollywood would have written a similar action movie by now.

The point is, it is hard for the writer to go wrong with such fantastic subject matter. Charles Townshend is a self confessed academic historian and true to this title has written an academic history of the Rising. At times insightful and thoughtful the work tends to drag the reader to places where they never expected to go. Townshend’s most remarkable feat is to spend the first 150 pages of his work discussing the build up to the Rising. This is slightly over indulgent but perhaps not unusual for an academic work. It does give scope for much comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the background as indeed the Rising as a subject deserves. But where does one start? 1169? 1803? 1867? Townshend takes the Act of Union in 1801 as his launch site. There is a perfectly reasonable place to begin but the author is a little light on nineteenth century Irish history. It is unfortunate, considering the brilliance of the second half of Easter 1916, that the Great Hunger was not treated in any depth by Townshend. One could argue that there is no need but it is like examining the Second World War without mentioning the Treaty of Versailles. The mass emigration, the psychological impact of the British Government abandoning the starving millions, these are a couple of important points that need to be explained. Otherwise one can question the necessity behind the call for Irish independence. Does anyone question the fact that it was the British Government’s lack of initiative in Ireland during the 1840’s that resulted in many more people dying of hunger and disease? The potato blight ruined successive crops but there was plenty of food available in this country, food that was exported, which makes sentences from Townshend’s book such as: “….the characteristic British values of reasonableness, compromise and non-violence seemed unable to cope with the passions evoked by the threat of Home Rule.” When dealing with Ireland such characteristics were obviously on ration. Another line that will probably be hard for some readers to swallow is: “In 1801 the ‘United Kingdom’ was created, with the aim of reducing the sharp division created between Irish Catholics and Protestants that had turned the 1798 rebellion into a vicious civil war.” That line might read better as “In 1801 the Irish Parliament was dissolved in dubious fashion with the aim of ensuring that the Irish, regardless of their religion, were punished for daring to declare an Irish Republic.”  Perhaps I’m splitting hairs but I believe academic writers have a responsibility to be accurate. To say that 1798 was a civil war is at worst fundamentally incorrect and at best a little misleading.

Townshend has concentrated heavily on Eoin MacNeill’s role, which is an interesting approach. Without doubt this is the fist history of 1916 that I have read where I almost felt sorry for, instead of being angry with, Eoin MacNeill. Indeed Townshend is correct in highlighting the fact that MacNeill and Bulmer Hobson tend to be glossed over as useful annoyances to the greater plan. But still, the fact remains, MacNeill and Hobson were not trusted by the IRB and in fact MacNeill as Chief of Staff of the Volunteers showed how untrustworthy he was by countermanding the order to muster on Easter Sunday. Townshend reckons that, despite MacNeill’s order, more people turned out on Sunday than Monday; “On Monday, only those who were indeed ‘anxious for war’ would turn out.” MacNeill’s historical file will always be marred by his cancellation of the Rising, and even as a founding member of the IV, he has rarely been portrayed in a good light. I suppose he has been overshadowed by the stronger characters in the drama having had none of the organizing abilities of MacDiarmada and Clarke, he was not the charismatic speaker or political thinker that Connolly was, he had none of the poetic charm of MacDonagh and he certainly could never have delivered an oration in the manner of Pearse. Nor indeed did he seem willing to risk his life in the same fashion as his comrades.

There are a few unfortunate mistakes in the book, which only a pedant like myself would take issue with. Is it fair to point out these errors? In an academic work I believe it is fair to do so because what makes an academic work citable is it’s accuracy. It’s not so bad that Townshend writes  “In Ulysses (set in July (sic) 1904), James Joyce gleefully recounted …etc.” (For the record or the second edition it was June 1904). Nor is it too costly an error to say the United Irelanders instead of the United Irishmen. There was no harp on the Irish Republic flag that was hoisted over the GPO. I’m not sure where this story originated but I have read it in a few books and I think it has become part of the folklore of The Rising, but the famous photographic sequence of the British posing with the captured flag clearly shows that there was no harp. It’s only an annoyance but one never says the Clan na Gael, a “the” is not required. Only Americans say Gaelic when referring to the language of Ireland. Personally I use the correct name Gaeilge but I had to chuckle when I read the following: “The tendency to call Gaelic the ‘Irish Language’ was a potent signal of this – perhaps subconscious – politicization.) Is the same true for the “English Language” one can only wonder?

Once Townshend got on to the actual fighting the book suddenly became much more readable and indeed at this stage it would be difficult to do anything but praise the following three hundred pages. Perhaps that proves the point that there is much more agreement on the aftermath of the Rising than there is on the build up to it. He is thorough and has a clear understanding of the fighting that occurred in the various positions. At hand are the very informative Military Archive Witness Statements. It’s clear that Townshend spent many laborious hours reading these and it pays dividends. Initial annoyance at that old clichéd question “why did they not take the Castle” was answered quite simply by Townshend himself. “It was not, it transpired, necessary to seize such obvious symbols as Dublin Castle to show that the established order was upheld by psychological as much as physical means.” The Rising in Dublin is treated in two parts, one, “To The Barricades” and two, “The Counterstroke”. This is an unusual approach to take but it works very well. It is also evident that more military minded historians, a sector of society who often find it difficult to comprehend the more controversial decisions made by those who planned to overthrow British rule in Ireland, will thoroughly enjoy Easter 1916. Yes, as Townshend points out on plenty of occasions, from a military point of view the leaders made many mistakes during the Rising. But there were an equal number of mistakes on the British side. Of course General “Conky” Maxwell’s executions would be the great turning point in public opinion but there were other mistakes. In fact few books on the Rising deal as brilliantly as this one from the British point of view. Everyone is familiar with the Battle of Mount Street Bridge but mostly from the Republican side. Something that I have often pondered was the reasoning behind the determination by the British Army to pass over Mount Street Bridge instead of crossing the Grand Canal at Baggot Street Bridge. Townshend explains that Colonel Maconchy explained to General Lowe by telephone that the situation at Clanwilliam House was serious and “deliberately asked whether the situation was serious enough to require that the position be taken at any cost.” General Lowe, although not considered to have the same lackadaisical attitude as “Conky” Maxell to the precious nature of life replied, “to come at all costs” which resulted in the largest British losses during the Rising.